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On Inequality Comparisons
Abstract
Is one distribution (of income, consumption, or some other economic variable) among families or individuals
more or less equal in relative terms than another? Despite the seeming straightforwardness of this question,
there has been and continues to be considerable debate over how to go about finding the answer.
There are two points of contention. One is the issue of cardinality vs. ordinality. Practitioners of the cardinal
approach compare distributions by means of summary measures such as a Gini coefficient, variance of
logarithms, and the like. For purposes of ranking the relative inequality of two distributions, the cardinality of
the usual measures is not only a source of controversy, but it is also redundant. Accordingly, some researchers
prefer an ordinal approach, adopting Lorenz domination as their criterion. The difficulty with the Lorenz
criterion is its incompleteness, affording rankings of only some pairs of distributions but not others. Current
practice in choosing between a cardinal or an ordinal approach is now roughly as follows: Check for Lorenz
domination in the hope of making an unambiguous comparison; if Lorenz domination fails, calculate one or
more cardinal measures.
This raises the second contentious issue: which of the many cardinal measures in existence should one adopt?
The properties of existing measures have been discussed extensively in several recent papers. Typically, these
studies have started with the measures and then examined their properties.
In this paper, we reverse the direction of inquiry. Our approach is to start by specifying as axioms a relatively
small number of properties which we believe a “good” index of inequality should have and then examining
whether the Lorenz criterion and the various cardinal measures now in use satisfy those properties. The key
issue is the reasonableness of the postulated properties. Work to date has shown the barrenness of the Pareto
criterion. Only recently have researchers begun to develop an alternative axiomatic structure. The purpose of
this paper is to contribute to such a development.
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 ON INEQUALITY COMPARISONS'
 BY GARY S. FIELDS AND JOHN C. H. FEI
 IS ONE DISTRIBUTION (of income, consumption, or some other economic vari-
 able) among families or individuals more or less equal in relative terms than
 another?2 Despite the seeming straightforwardness of this question, there has
 been and continues to be considerable debate over how to go about finding the
 answer.
 There are two points of contention. One is the issue of cardinality vs. ordinal-
 ity. Practitioners of the cardinal approach compare distributions by means of
 summary measures such as a Gini coefficient, variance of logarithms, and the
 like. For purposes of ranking the relative inequality of two distributions, the
 cardinality of the usual measures is not only a source of controversy, but it is also
 redundant.3 Accordingly, some researchers prefer an ordinal approach, adopting
 Lorenz domination as their criterion. The difficulty with the Lorenz criterion is
 its incompleteness, affording rankings of only some pairs of distributions but not
 others. Current practice in choosing between a cardinal or an ordinal approach is
 now roughly as follows: Check for Lorenz domination in the hope of making an
 unambiguous comparison; if Lorenz domination fails, calculate one or more
 cardinal measures.
 This raises the second contentious issue: which of the many cardinal measures
 in existence should one adopt? The properties of existing measures have been
 discussed extensively in several recent papers.4 Typically, these studies have
 started with the measures and then examined their properties.
 In this paper, we reverse the direction of inquiry. Our approach is to start by
 specifying as axioms a relatively small number of properties which we believe a
 "good" index of inequality should have and then examining whether the Lorenz
 criterion and the various cardinal measures now in use satisfy those properties.
 The key issue is the reasonableness of the postulated properties. Work to date
 has shown the barrenness of the Pareto criterion.5 Only recently have re-
 searchers begun to develop an alternative axiomatic structure.6 The purpose
 of this paper is to contribute to such a development.
 l Portions of this research were financed by the International Bank for Reconstruction and
 Development under RPO/284. However, the views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of
 IBRD.
 2Throughout this paper, we shall talk in terms of income distributions among families. All results
 apply, however, without modification to comparisons of inequality in the distribution of any
 quantifiable economic magnitude.
 3Cardinality of inequality is redundant and controversial for purposes of ranking of distributions
 in the same sense that cardinal utility is redundant and controversial in the analysis of consumer
 choices. See Hicks [5, p. 17].
 4 See Champernowne [2], Kondor [7], Sen [10, Chapter 2], and Szal and Robinson [12].
 5For an axiomatic development of the Pareto criterion, see Sen [10].
 6Noteworthy are the axiomatic approaches in the work by Kondor [7] on relative inequality
 indices and by Sen [11] on absolute poverty measures.
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 In Section 1, we shall postulate three axioms: scale irrelevance, symmetry, and
 desirability of rank-preserving equalization. Then, in Section 2, we will use these
 axioms to investigate and strengthen previous results by Rothschild and Stiglitz
 [9] and others regarding the consistency of alternative orderings in terms of
 Lorenz domination. The principal result of this paper is that the three axioms are
 sufficient to justify the Lorenz criterion for comparing the relative inequality of
 two distributions. Like the Lorenz criterion, the axiomatic system so constructed
 is incomplete. This incompleteness is intentional, for it allows us to ascertain
 which of the indices in current use do or do not satisfy our axioms (Section 3).7
 Those that do are the Gini coefficient, coefficient of variation, Atkinson index,
 and Theil index. This lends support to their reasonableness. However, they differ
 in ways which lie outside the scope of our axioms. Hopefully, future researchers
 will add to our axioms so as to narrow down this incompleteness.
 1. THREE AXIOMS FOR INEQUALITY COMPARISONS
 Suppose there are n families in an economy whose incomes may be represen-
 ted by the non-negative row vector
 (1.1) X = (X1 X2 ... Xn) ?
 in the non-negative orthant of the n-dimension income distribution space f2+.
 A point in Q2+ is a pattern of income distribution. In this paper, we shall exclude
 the origin (O 0 .... 0) (i.e., when no family receives any income) from Q2+. The
 object of inequality comparisons between two such patterns is to be able to say
 that one is more or less equal than the other. More specifically, we wish to
 introduce a complete pre -ordering8 of all points in Q2+, i.e., a binary relation "R"
 defined on ordered pairs in Q2+ satisfying the conditions of comparability and
 transitivity:
 (1.2a) Comparability. For any X and Y in Q2+, exactly one of the following is
 true: (i) XR. . . in which case we write X > Y and read "X is more
 equal than Y;" (ii) YRX.... in which case we write Y > X and read " Y
 is more equal than X;" (iii) XR Y and YRX... in which case we write
 X Y and read "X and Y are equally unequal."
 (1.26b) Transitivity. XR Y and YRZ implies XRZ.
 We now introduce three properties which we shall propose as axioms for
 inequality comparisons. Not only do these seem reasonable to us but in addition
 they have been used by previous writers on inequality.
 7 Indices of inequality, including those mentioned above, are cardinal measures which naturally
 introduce a pre-ordering. Thus, rigorously, it is the pre-ordering R induced by the index which
 satisfies our axioms.
 8 Intuitively, a complete pre-ordering has exactly the same meaning as the ranking of commodity
 bundles by ordinary (ordinal) indifference curves in consumer analysis.
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 First, suppose two distributions X and Y are scalar multiples of one another:
 (1.3) X = a Y, i.e., (Xi X2 ... Xn)=(aY, aY2 .. . a Yn), a > O.
 Because inequality in the distribution of income and the level of income enter as
 separate arguments into judgments of social well-being, it would seem reason-
 able and desirable for the measure of inequality to be independent of the level of
 income.9 For this reason, we require that the two distributions X and Y in (1.3)
 be ranked as equally unequal.10. Hence, we postulate:
 A1. AXIOM OF SCALE IRRELEVANCE: X = a Y (a > 0) implies X - Y.
 This axiom allows us to normalize all distributions X in Q2+ according to the
 fraction of income received by each family:
 (1.4) [X = (Xl X2 . . . . Xn)]-j0 = (01 02 ... n)]
 where
 Oi =Xil(X,+X2+. ..+Xn) for i=1,2, . . .,n.
 The totality of all such normalized patterns, Qc, is the subset of points 0=
 (01 02 ... *n) of Q2+ satisfying the conditions
 (1.5) i0?0 and O0i=1.
 Axiom 1 assures us:
 LEMMA 1.1: If a preordering R is first defined on Q2c, then it can be extended
 uniquely to Q+.
 Next, suppose the elements in one vector X are a permutation of the elements
 of Y, i.e., the frequency distributions of income are the same but different
 individuals receive the income in the the two cases. On the principle of treating
 all individuals or families as the same with regard to income distributions, these
 two patterns can be characterized by the same degree of inequality. Hence, we
 state:
 A2. AXIOM OF SYMMETRY:" If (i1, i2,. , in) is any permutation of
 (1, 2, . . ., n) then (Xi X2 ... Xn )z (Xi, Xi 2 ... Xin)-
 9 Note that in positing that the measure of relative inequality is independent of the level of income,
 we do not wish to suggest that our feelings about inequality are invariant with income level. On this, see
 Hirschman and Rothschild [6].
 10 Following Atkinson [1], we would note that this condition is analogous to constant relative
 inequality aversion. For further applications of this notion to inequality comparisons, see also the
 papers by Rothschild and Stiglitz [9] and Dasgupta, Sen, and Starrett [4].
 11 A2 is sometimes referred to as the axiom of anonymity in the literature (see Sen [10]). Sen also
 includes an illuminating discussion highlighting the conflicts between A2 and a Benthamite utili-
 tarian approach to social judgments (in which social welfare is taken as the sum of individual
 utilities).
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 Let (i-, i i ii) be a particular permutation of (1, 2,..n). Then those 6 = (61 02. . . , 6M) in Qc which satisfy the condition
 (1.6) oit 1< oitS *< * *
 comprise a rank-preserving subset of Qc. There are altogether n! such rank-
 preserving subsets. Suppose R is defined for any one of them. Then A2 allows us
 to extend it uniquely to the entire set QC and, by Lemma 1.1, to the full income
 distribution space n+. For convenience, we shall work with the permutation with
 the natural order (1, 2, . . . , n). Denote the corresponding rank-preserving
 subset as Q2o, which includes all points satisfying the conditions
 n
 (1.7) 01 _< 02 . * n; o6 0 ?; Oi = 1.
 i=l1
 Q0 will be referred to as the monotonic rank-preserving set. Al and A2 allow us
 to state the following:
 LEMMA 1.2: Under A1 and A2, if R is first defined on the monotonic rank-
 preserving set f20, then it can be extended uniquely io n+.
 Notice from Lemma 1.2 that after postulating Al and A2, we can restrict our
 search for "reasonable" properties to the space f2Q.
 Next, let X and Y be two alternative distributions in f2Q such that X is
 obtained from Y by the transfer of a positive amount of income h from a
 relatively rich family j to a poorer family i, i < j. We shall write X = E(Y) and
 say that X is obtained from Y by a rank-preserving equalization. For a particular
 pair i, j (i < j), there is a maximum amount which can be transferred if the rank is
 to be preserved. Formally:
 DEFINITION: Rank-Preserving Equalization. X = E(Y) if for some i, j (i < j)
 and h >0,
 (1.8a) Xk= Yk for k 5 i, j,
 Xi= Yi+h,
 Xi = Y1 - h, where:
 (1.8b) if j=i+l, h42(Y1-Yi);
 if j>i+l, h -min [(Yi+1- Yi), (Y - Yi1)].
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 The next axiom which we shall introduce is:
 A3. AXIOM OF RANK-PRESERVING EQUALIZATION: In nO, if X = E( Y),
 thenX> Y.'2
 The intuitive justification for this axiom is simply that it is reasonable to regard
 as more equal a distribution which can be derived from another by a richer
 person giving a part of his income to a poorer person. Defining the perfect
 equality point as P = (1/n 1/n . . . 1/n), any income distribution point X in Qf
 can be transformed into P by a finite sequence of rank-preserving equaliza-
 tions.13 Thus A3 and the transitivity of the ordering imply:
 LEMMA 1.3: P=(1/n 1/n ... 1/n)>XforallX E=Qo.
 The proof is immediate.
 Notice that A3 has been introduced only on 10. Suppose now we introduce an
 R on Qn satisfying all three axioms. By Lemma 1.2, R can be extended uniquely
 to the entire income distribution space Q+. It is clear that A3 is automatically
 extended. Formally:
 DEFINITION: Let X and Y be two patterns of income distribution in Q+. We
 shall say that X is obtained from Y by a rank preserving equalization, in notation
 X = E(Y), if (a) X and Y belong to the same rank preserving subset;14 (b) X is
 obtained from Y by the transfer of a positive amount of income h from a
 relatively rich family (e.g. Yq = Xq - h) to a relatively poor family (e.g. Y, = X, +
 h)for Yq> Yp.
 Notice that X = E(Y) is now defined for the entire income distribution space
 Q+. However, this definition coincides with the previous definition (1.8a, b)
 where both X and Y belong to Qn. Thus:
 LEMMA 1.4: If R is first defined on the monotonic rank-preserving set QO
 satisfying A 1-A 3, the unique extension of R to Q+ also possesses the property of
 desirability of rank preserving equalization, i.e., if X = E(Y), then X > Y.
 2. ORDINAL APPROACH TO INEQUALITY COMPARISONS: ZONES OF AMBIGUITY
 AND LORENZ DOMINATION
 In the last section, we showed that if we postulate a set of "reasonable"
 axioms for R on Qn, then R can be extended from Qn to the entire income
 12 Precedent for this axiom dates back at least half a century to Dalton [3], who called this the
 "principle of transfers."
 13 This assertion is easily proven by constructing a sequence of transfers from families above the
 mean to those below.
 14 For some permutation i1 i2 . . . in, if Yil s Yi2' s . . . Yin then Xil S X2 S * * * S Xn-
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 distribution space !2+. We have not as yet considered whether the three axioms
 are sufficient to allow us to compare any two points X, Y in Q+ according to the
 comparability condition (1.2.a). In this section, we examine when inequality
 comparisons can or cannot be made using A1-A3.
 A. Zones of Ambiguity
 We shall now show that there are well-defined ranges in which inequality
 comparisons can be made using A1-A3 alone and other well-defined zones of
 ambiguity where comparisons cannot be made without further specification of
 the rules of ordering. We shall also establish that there is a direct one-to-one
 correspondence between the zones of ambiguity and the more familiar concept
 of Lorenz domination, which we examine below.
 The first concept we need to introduce is a sequence of equalizations from a
 given point Y E f2O according to the following definition:
 DEFINITION: X is obtained from Y by a finite sequence of equalizations,
 X= T(Y), when
 (2.1) X=Ek(. . . E2(E1(Y)) . .
 Starting from a given point Y, we can define three sets Y*, Y*, and M as
 follows:
 (2.2a) Y*={XIX= T(Y)},
 (2.2b) Y* ={XI T(X) = Y},
 (2.2c) M =QO - Y* u Y*.
 Y* is the set of all points in QO obtained from Y by a sequence of equalizing
 transfers, while Y* includes those points in QO from which a sequence of
 equalizing transfers will lead to Y. We can also talk about disequalizing transfers
 as the transfer of income from a relatively poor to a relatively rich family, in
 which case Y* is the set of all X which can be obtained from Y by a sequence of
 disequalizing transfers. The set M contains all other points of fQO.
 It follows from A3 that points in Y*, obtained from Y by a sequence of
 equalizations, are more equal than Y, i.e., X : Y* implies X > Y. Similarly,
 X E Y* implies X < Y. From (2.2c), it follows that the set M contains all points
 which are not unambiguously comparable with Y under A1-A3. A point Z in M
 can always be transformed into Y by a finite sequence of rank-preserving
 transfers. However, any such sequence necessarily involves at least one equal-
 ization and at least one disequalization-which is why Z cannot be compared
 with Y. The theorem we prove below, Theorem 2.1, implies that the Lorenz
 curves of Z and Y necessarily cross each other. We now consider Lorenz
 domination.
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 B. Lorenz Domination
 One distribution is said to Lorenz-dominate another if the Lorenz curve of the
 first distribution never lies below that of the second and lies above it at least one
 point. For two points X and Y in Qo:
 DEFINITION: X Lorenz -dominates Y (in notation, Lx - Ly) when
 (2.3a) X1+X2+. . .+Xi Y1+ Y2+. .. + Y;
 for j=1, 2, . . ., n-1,
 (2.3b) X1+X2+. . .+X> Y1+Y2+...+Y;
 for some j < n.
 Notice that
 n n
 (2.4) Xi=E Yi= 1 in mo.
 i=l i=l
 Our basic theorem is:
 THEOREM 2.1: X E Y* if and only if Lx - Ly.
 Thus, the Lorenz Curve of Y is dominated by the Lorenz Curves of all X E Y*,
 dominates those of X E Y*, and crosses those of X E M, i.e., neither dominates
 the other.
 The necessary condition of the theorem (i.e., X E Y* implies that the Lorenz
 curve of X dominates that of Y) is a well-known result.15 The sufficient condi-
 tion of the theorem states that whenever the Lorenz curve of X dominates that
 of Y (i.e., Lx - Ly), X can be obtained from Y by a sequence of equalizations
 which are rank-preserving.16 This sufficient condition, when proved, along with
 (2.2.a), will allow us to conclude that Lorenz domination implies greater equal-
 ity. This may be summarized as:
 COROLLARY 2.2. Under A3, for X, Y in Q2O, Lx - Ly implies X > Y.
 C. Proof of the Sufficient Condition of Theorem 2.1
 The sufficient condition of Theorem 2.1 holds that whenever X Lorenz-
 dominates Y, there exists a sequence of rank-preserving equalizations leading
 from Y to X. In order to prove the validity of this part of the theorem, we must
 produce a rule for finding the necessary sequence. The derivation of the rule
 follows.
 15 See Atkinson [1], Rothschild and Stiglitz [9], and Dasgupta, Sen, and Starrett [4].
 16 Rothschild and Stiglitz have proven that when the Lorenz Curve of X dominates that of Y, it is
 possible to construct a sequence of transfers which may or may not be rank-preserving, i.e., they may
 move out of and back into f20. The sufficient condition which we shall prove in the text is a stronger
 version requiring that such a sequence be rank-preserving and stay within f20.
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 Consider any two distributions X and Y in Q2O. Let their difference be denoted
 by
 (2.5 a) d = (di d2 . .. dn) = (X1- Yl X2 -Y2 ..Xn -Yn),
 (2.5b) Zdi=0.
 The n elements of d can be partitioned consecutively into r subsets
 (D1 D2 ... Dr) according to the following rules:
 (2.6a) Every di belongs to one Dj.
 (2.6b) Every Dj contains at least one non-zero di.
 (2.6c) If di E Di and dp E Dq, then j < q implies i < p.
 (2.6d) The first element of D2, D3, . . . , Dr is non-zero.
 (2.6e) All die Di are non-positive or non-negative [Di is called positive (or
 negative) according to the signs of the di in Di.]
 (2.6f) The Di alternate in sign.
 The partition determined by (2.6.a-f) is unique. Furthermore, if X # Y, then
 there is at least one strictly positive di and one strictly negative di. Thus,
 (2.7) if X# Y, r 2. 17
 We can also define
 (2.8) Si= E di for j=l, ...,r
 di EDi
 with the properties
 (2.9a) Si i4O , j= 1,29,...,.r,
 (2.9b) Si, S2, . . , Sr alternate in sign,
 r n
 (2.9c) E Si= g di=0.
 J==1 1=. .
 We may now state a general rule for rank preserving equalizations from X to
 Y:(a) Identify the groups according to (2.6). (b) With each transfer, eliminate
 the gap between X and Y of one family's income by (i) taking from the poorest
 family (the pth) with non-zero d in the richest group (S), (ii) giving to the richest
 family (the qth) with non-zero d in the next lower group (Sr-i), (iii) compute the
 amount of transfer as the smaller of dp and -dq. (c) Repeat these steps (a, b)
 again, each time eliminating the gap for another family's income.
 To prove the validity of this rule, we need to draw on the Lorenz domination
 condition of Theorem 2.1 by the following lemma.
 17 The number (r- 1) may be thought of as a crossing index since if we were to plot the two
 distributions X and Y with two curves they would cross (r - 1) times.
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 LEMMA 2.3: When X $ Y, Lx L y is equivalent to (2.10.a, b)
 (2.1Oa) di d1-O for i=1,...,n,
 j=1
 p
 (2.1Ob) E Sj-O for p=1,...,r.
 j=1
 PROOF: (2.3.a, b) imply (2.10.a). Conversely (2.10.a) implies (2.3.a) and, since
 X $ Y, it also implies (2.3.b). Thus, (2.3.a, b) and (2.1Oa) are equivalent when
 X $ Y. It follows directly from (2.8) that (2.10.a) implies (2.10.b). Thus
 we need only prove the reverse implication. Suppose di E Dq =
 (da+i da+2 ... da+mq). Then define
 Vi= d1=Sl+S2+-..+Sq-1+da+i+...+di.
 j=1
 We want to prove Vi - 0. In this expression,
 (2.1 la) S = Sl + S2 + * * * + Sq_1 1?: 0 (by (2 10Ob)),
 (2.11b) Sq = da+1 +... + da+mq, where all d's have the same sign,
 (2.1lc) Va+mq=S+ SqO 0 (by 2.1O.b).
 Thus, di is one member of a sequence (Va+1, Va+2 ... ., Va+mq ) which either (i) is
 monotonically increasing from S - 0 if Dq is a positive set, or (ii) is monotonic-
 ally decreasing to S + Sq - 0 if Dq is a negative set. In either case, Vi - 0.
 Q.E.D.
 Notice that (2.9.a, c) and (2. 10.b) imply Si > 0 and Sr < 0. Thus (2.9.b) implies
 r is even. Hence,
 LEMMA 2.4: Lx BLy implies r is even and the Si can be grouped into r/2 pairs
 with the indicated signs:
 (2.12) (S1 S2) (S3S4 ) ... (Sr- is-)
 Then when Lx - LY, families in the last group Sr of X must be relatively poorer
 than those in Y The opposite is true for the group S+r-.
 Before we can prove the validity of the rule, we need one more lemma. In this
 lemma suppose Y'= (Y Y' ... Y') is obtained from Y by a single rank-
 preserving equalization. Let
 {v. 13 d'= (d' . ')=(Xi -Y' X - Y' Xn -Y')-
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 Then:
 LEMMA 2.5: If Lx - Ly, there exists Y' E O such that
 (2.14a) Y'= E(Y),
 (2.14 b) Lx :--L y,,
 (2.14c) di = 0 implies di = 0,
 (2.14d) there is at least one integer j such that di ?0 and d, = 0.
 PROOF: Suppose the last non-zero di in S' 1 in (2.12) is dp and the first
 non-zero di in S7 is dq (q >p). Thus, by this choice, we have
 (2.15) d,+1 = dp+2 =...=d,1_1 = O.
 Let
 (2.16) h = min (dp, -dq)= min (Xp - Yp, Yq -Xq)> 0.
 When h is transferred from the qth family to the pth family of Y, let the result be
 denoted by Y'. Then obviously (2.14.a, c, d) are satisfied. To prove (b), we have
 Fdl+d2+. . .+di for i<p or i -q,
 (2.17) d +d'+.. .+dX=' dl+d2+. . .+di-h=dl+d2+. .+dp_l+dp-h
 t for p i<q.
 The first sum d1 + d2+. . .+di -0 by (2.10.a). In the second sum, d1 + d2+. . +
 dp-1 is non-negative by Lorenz-domination (2. 10.a) and (dp - h) is non-negative
 because h - dp. Thus d +d +.. .+dd.0 and Lx -LY by (2.10.a). Q.E.D.
 Lemma 2.5 assures us that we can repeat the same operation on Y' by
 reducing one additional non-zero entry of d'. Since there are only a finite
 number of non-zero di we have:
 LEMMA 2.6: If Lx L y, then there exists a sequence of rank -preserving trans -
 fers T such that X = T( Y) and T involves at most m steps, where m is the number
 of non-zero di in d (as given by (2.5)).
 The proof of the sufficient condition of Theorem 2.1 follows directly from
 Lemma 2.6, as does the validity of the rule presented above.
 D. Theorem 2.1 and the Lorenz Criterion
 Theorem 2.1 has a ready application to zones of ambiguity and Lorenz-
 domination. When comparing two distributions X and Y, a simple rule for
 determining when Lx crosses Ly (i.e., when X E M) is to examine the sign of the
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 first and last non -zero di and, if they have the same sign, the Lorenz curves must
 18
 cross.
 From Theorem 2.1, it follows that the axiomatic system A1-A3 constitutes a
 rigorous justification for the Lorenz criterion for comparing the relative
 inequality of two income distributions. Of course, the Lorenz criterion is
 incomplete, and the three axioms are also. Completeness is customarily achieved
 via cardinality, but the cardinal indices in current use do not necessarily satisfy
 A1-A3. In what follows, we examine which of the usual indices satisfy our three
 axioms and which do not.
 3. CARDINAL INDEX APPROACH TO INEQUALITY COMPARISONS
 The traditional approach for comparing the inequality of two distributions is
 to compute a cardinal index of inequality I with domain Q2+:
 (3.1) I=f(X)=f(Xl X2 ... Xn), Xi : 0.
 Examples are the Gini coefficient, coefficient of variation, range, and others
 which we shall consider below. Inequality comparisons are made according to
 the following definition:
 DEFINITION-Pre-Ordering Induced by an Index: A real-valued index of
 inequality I =f(X) induces a complete pre-ordering R as follows: for all X,
 YE Q2+, XRY when f(X)tf(Y).19
 Notice that the cardinality of the index (3.1) is unnecessary for the question of
 determining which is the more equal of two distributions, since the essential
 information for this purpose is all contained in the pre-ordering R which f(X)
 induces.
 It is the purpose of this section to explore whether R's induced by many
 familiar inequality indices indeed satisfy the three axioms introduced in Section
 1. When a particular index I = f (X) in (3.1) satisfies restrictions (3.2.a-c), the
 following theorem insures that R satisfies A1-A3:
 THEOREM 3.1: The pre-ordering R induced by an index I=f(X) satisfies
 A1-A3 when:
 (3.2a) homogeneous of degree zero: f (X) = f (aX), a >0;
 (3.2b) symmetry: f (Xi1 Xi2 ... Xin) = f (X1 X2 ... Xn), where
 (il, i2,. . . X in) is a permutation of (1, 2, . . , n);
 18However, if they have opposite signs, they may or may not cross and it is necessary to compare
 the full distributions.
 19 Notice that (3.1) measures inequality and therefore a more equal distribution has a lower index.
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 (3.2c) monotonicity of partial derivative:
 af -fi(X)< =af=(X) for i<j and Xe!)O.
 PROOF: (3.2a) and (3.2b) respectively insure that the induced ordering
 satisfies Al and A2. To show A3 holds on f2o, suppose X is obtained from Y by
 a rank-preserving equalization. It is readily seen that the difference I(X)-I(Y)
 is negative by (2.2.c) for an equalization of any positive sum. Thus, A3 is
 satisfied.
 Using Theorem 3.1, we may prove:
 THEOREM 3.2: The following inequality indices satisfy Al-A3:
 (3.3) Coefficient of Variation: C = o-/X where (J = vE (X, -X)2/n and
 X =1i Xi/n.
 (3.4) Gini Coefficient: G =-1--+ 2X [Xl+ 2X2+. .nXn
 n nX2f
 (3.5) Atkinson Index :20
 A=l-[[(X')- +(2) +(n) ] >
 (3.6) Theil Index :21 T= Xi log nXi.
 At the suggestion of the editor, the proof of Theorem 3.2 is omitted due to space
 limitations.
 The fulfillment of Al-A3 by these measures strengthens both the axioms and
 the indices. The axioms are seen to be relevant to a number of measures with
 which we have considerable experience. In turn, the indices are seen to have
 several properties whose desirability is a matter of substantial agreement.
 Despite the large number of indices which satisfy our three axioms, there are
 other indices in common use which violate them, particularly Al and A3. The
 difficulty with those indices which violate Al (e.g., variance) is that they are not
 independent of the level of income. Those indices which do not satisfy A3 are in
 some circumstances insensitive to certain rank-preserving equalizations. One
 example is the family of fractile ranges (e.g., interquartile range); any rank-
 preserving equalizations within a segment (e.g., within a quartile) leave the index
 unchanged, in violation of A3. Another example is the Kuznets Ratio:22
 (3.7) K == v_ I i _-1l/n I
 20 See Atkinson [1].
 21 See Theil [13].
 22 See Kuznets [8].
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 which is unchanged by any rank-preserving equalization or disequalization on
 the same side of the mean. To the extent that A1-A3 are reasonable, all indices
 which violate them are less than satisfactory; their popular use in empirical work
 cannot be defended by these axioms and must be justified on other grounds.
 4. CONCLUSION
 In this paper, we have developed an approach to inequality comparisons
 which differs from the conventional one. Beginning by postulating three axioms,
 we showed that the axiomatic system so constructed is sufficient to justify the
 Lorenz criterion for inequality comparisons. However, like the Lorenz criterion,
 the axiomatic system is incomplete. Past researchers have achieved complete-
 ness by the use of cardinal inequality measures. We showed that many but by no
 means all of the commonly used indices satisfy our three axioms. The ones which
 do satisfy the axioms agree on the ranking of distributions whose Lorenz curves
 do not intersect. However, when Lorenz curves do intersect, the various
 measures partition the income distribution space differently. Since the three
 axioms are insufficient to determine the specific partition to use, the use of any of
 the conventional measures implicitly accepts the additional welfare judgments
 associated with that measure.
 The key issue for inequality comparisons is the reasonableness of the ordering
 criterion, which in the case of cardinal measures is the index itself. An axiomatic
 approach is probably the ideal method for confronting this issue, because the
 reasonable properties (i.e., the axioms) are postulated explicitly. At minimum,
 this approach facilitates communication by enabling (and indeed requiring) one
 to set forth clearly his own viewpoints and value judgments for scrutiny by
 others. But in addition, to the extent that one person's judgments (such as those
 in our three axioms) are acceptable to others, controversies over inequality
 comparisons may be resolved. We have seen that our three axioms are
 incomplete insofar as they cannot determine the ordinal ranking uniquely. A
 feasible and desirable direction for future research is to investigate what further
 axioms could be introduced to complete the axiomatic system or at least to
 reduce further the zones of ambiguity.
 It is conceivable that beyond some point the search for new axioms may turn
 out to be unrewarding. In that case, inequality comparisons will always be
 subject to arbitary specifications of welfare weights. The selection of suitable
 weights by whatever reasonable criterion one cares to exercise is a less desirable
 but possibly more practical alternative than a strictly axiomatic approach.
 Our research has hopefully made clear that inequality comparisons cannot be
 made without adopting value judgments, explicit or otherwise, about the
 desirability of incomes accruing to persons at different positions in the income
 distribution. Even the Lorenz criterion, which permits us to rank the relative
 inequality of different distributions in only a fraction of the cases, embodies such
 judgments. The traditional inequality indices such as those considered in Section
 3, to the extent they complete the ordering, embody some value judgments
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 beyond our three axioms. The axiomatic bases for these judgments are at
 present vague, and it would be helpful if future researchers could state these
 implicit value judgments in axiomatic terms so that when a particular inequality
 index is used we will know exactly what judgments are being made.
 Yale University
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